Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis is only the most recent reminder of the primary importance of risk management for financial institutions. On the one hand, as Carey and Stulz (2005) have emphasized, there cannot be a franchise value without taking on risk.
On the other hand, Merton (1993) has cautioned that although taking on risk may enable a financial firm to make profits, it can also damage its franchise value with customers. In its most extreme manifestation, damaged franchise value can cause the demise of the financial firm as credit, counterparties and clients dry up and disappear with resulting losses for all concerned. The nationalization of Northern Rock and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007 are recent, vivid examples of how excessive managerial risk-taking can damage a financial firm's franchise value and the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, including shareholders, creditors, counterparties and clients. Indeed, the sheer level of economic damage and social repercussions caused by the crisis has attracted the attention and involvement of politicians, governments and regulators. Thus, it is of considerable academic and practical interest to understand what factors, if any, affect managerial risk-taking by financial institutions. Indeed, in a survey of emerging themes in the banking sector, Wilson et al. (2010) underline the importance of risk-taking incentives and the implications for systemic stability. In this paper we look at the factors that could affect managerial appetite for risk-taking and examine their effect on the level of firm volatility for a set of large, UK financial institutions over the period 2000 to 2008.
Although firm performance has often been the focus of studies on managerial decision making, 1 the relationship between managerial decision making and firm risk has also been considered. Many of these studies look at the effect of managerial equity based compensation on firm risk in the context of the agency conflict that opposes managers and shareholders. In the non-financial sector, for example, Agarwal and Mandelker (1987) , DeFusco et al. (1990) and Chok and Sun (2007) find a positive relationship between firm risk and option-based compensation. In the financial sector, Saunders et al. (1990) find that banks with high managerial equity ownership exhibit greater risk than those with low managerial equity ownership, while Chen et al. (1998) , employing a similar methodology over a different time period, find the contrary. However, Chen et al. (2006) , focusing on option-based compensation, find that both option based compensation and option based wealth increase firm risk in the banking industry. Other studies look at the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Pathan (2009), for example, assesses the relationship between firm risk and board structure and finds that strong bank boards that reflect shareholder interests positively affect bank firm risk while the CEO's ability to control board decisions negatively affects it. Similarly, Akhigbe and Martin (2008) investigate the influence of governance and disclosure on risk in the US financial services sector and provide some evidence that stronger disclosure and governance reduce firm risk. None of the risk-based studies consider managerial risk appetite and the effect it could have on risk-taking.
1 For studies in the non-financial sector see, for example: Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Lewellen et al. (1987) , Jensen and Murphy (1990a,b) , Agrawal et al. (1991 ), Mehran (1995 ,), Goldberg and Idson (1995) , Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , and Core et al. (1999) . For the financial sector see: Barro and Barro (1990) , Crawford et al. (1995) , Hubbard and Palia (1995) , Collins et al. (1995) , Houston and James (1995) , Fields and Fraser (1999), and John et al. (2000) . Swalm (1966) , Levy (1969) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , show that typical preferences must include risk seeking as well as risk averse segments. 3 The stochastic dominance literature developed by Hadar and Russell (1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969) , which includes the concepts of conditional stochastic dominance (Clark and Jokung, 1999) and marginal conditional stochastic dominance (Shalit and Yitshaki, 1994) extends this insight and provides decision rules for both risk seekers and risk averters.
Besides risk aversion and risk seeking, risk neutrality also figures as an important representation of risk appetite in modern financial theory and practice. Since Cox and Ross (1976) , many, if not most, asset pricing models are based on the concept of risk neutrality. Therefore, given the importance of risk appetite in financial decision-making, the issue of risk-taking in the financial sector warrants further inquiry.
2 Expected utility theory has been extended beyond the concept of risk aversion. For example, using the same methodology as the Pratt (1964) analysis of risk aversion, Kimball (1990) developed the concept of prudence for analyzing problems where the uncertainty affects marginal utility rather than utility. 3 There is circumstantial evidence of widespread risk-seeking behavior in the US mortgage sector leading up to the crisis, although those that sought the risk are not necessarily those who ended up bearing the risk..
Our study is a first step in this direction. Along with firm specific characteristics such as size and leverage, it explicitly considers the CEO risk appetite as a determinant of the volatility of financial firms' returns. The period itself is interesting because it includes the dot.com crisis at the beginning of the century, the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 and the crisis itself. The case of the UK is also interesting because it differs in one significant aspect from that of the US, the object of most research on the determinants of firm volatility. Amihud and Lev (1981) , Holmstrom and Ricart ICosta (1986) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) have provided evidence that managers avoid taking risks, including those that enhance firm value, due to career concerns. According to this view, managers may even spend corporate resources to diversify their companies' operational risks to protect their career.
for example, has shown that violations of the absolute priority rule, as witnessed under debtor-friendly codes, can lead to greater risk-taking.
The main contribution of this paper is that the empirical results indicate that CEO risk appetite does, in fact, play an important role in the determination of the volatility of firms in the financial sector. The portion of CEO risk appetite captured by the CEO's demographic characteristics is statistically significant. CEO age has a positive effect on firm volatility, while CEO education, job tenure and experience on other boards affect it negatively. Finally, CEO wealth is marginally significant, suggesting that an increase in wealth leads to more risk-taking.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data used in the study, provides our expectation about the effect of the variables on firm risk, and describes the method adopted for the analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical results, section 4 the robustness tests and section 5 concludes.
Data and methodology

Data selection
We hand collected data from Boardex and company annual reports on CEO risk appetite starting from a sample of 65 financial firms listed on the FTSE 250 as of January Fraser (2000), we employ a two-factor model to decompose total firm volatility into two separate market-based volatility measures. where r j is the daily return on firm j, r m is the daily return on the market (proxied here by the FTSE AllShare index), I is the daily 90-day Treasury bill, and e j is a random error term. Estimation of equation (1) produces the following volatility measures for each firm-year: β mj , which is a measure of systematic volatility (SYSV), and σ ej , the standard deviation of the residuals, which is a proxy for firm idiosyncratic volatility (IDIOV).
Data description
One route to estimating measures of risk appetite requires the specification of a utility function.
7 Given the wide range of potential functions and the difficulty of verifying that any given function is the right one, this looks like a dead end street. An alternative to specifying a particular utility function is to use the primitive determinants of risk appetite that have been consistently documented in the recent empirical literature:
wealth, age, education, and experience. 8 Hall (1998) argues that risk appetite can be proxied by demographic and executive biographical characteristics and many studies suggest that this is, in fact, the case. Grimm and Smith (1991) and Gottesman and Morey discussed below. For convenience, empirical definitions of all variables are presented in Table 1 .
Our measure of CEO wealth includes all equity-based holdings, including vested and non-vested options. Unlike previous studies, our measure for option-based wealth is more comprehensive, and consists of the value of all unexpired stock and LTIP (longterm incentive plans) options accumulated and held by the CEO to date. 9 There is a strong argument that equity based wealth (CEO wealth) should have a positive effect on firm volatility, because option values are positively related to the stock variance.
10
According to Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) , incorporating stock options into executive compensation would predispose CEOs to take riskier decisions than they would On the other hand, Smith and Stultz (1985) argue that since the value of option-based compensation is sensitive to changes in the underlying stock price -as the stock price increases (decreases), value of the options increases (decreases) -CEOs holding in or at-the money options in an undiversified portfolio would be exposed to firm-specific risk and hence may be inclined to reduce this risk in order to preserve the stock price. Thus, the foregoing discussion suggests that the CEO wealth can affect firm risk either positively or negatively.
Although it is generally agreed that age, education and experience are likely to affect firm volatility, there is no definitive argument on the direction it will take. Vroom and Pahl (1971) and Hitt and Tyler (1991) document a negative relation between executives' age and risk taking and argue that older CEOs are more cautious and conservative and therefore less likely to take risks. Golden and Zajac (2001) , however, find that strategic change is positively related to age, and argued that it requires a degree of confidence and experience to introduce strategic change and that this is mainly present in senior and older managers. More recently, Chok and Sun (2007) find that the age of managers positively affects idiosyncratic volatility, concluding that only experienced leaders dare to take big risks. Where education is concerned, there is some evidence in the medical journals of a negative relationship between education and risk aversion (see Rosen et al., 2003) attributed to the argument that the educated individual should have a more thorough understanding and knowledge of the nature and consequences of a specific decision, thereby overcoming a "fear" of risk. The counterargument is that lack of education may impair the executive's ability to fully understand the decision at hand, and can lead to a risky choice because of an incomplete grasp of the consequences. This study uses the number of professional and academic degrees to proxy for education.
Where CEO experience is concerned, it can be argued that a degree of experience is required to recognize the potential benefits of risk taking, such that the more experienced CEO may have a greater appetite for risk. The counter-argument is that experience leads the CEO to recognize the pitfalls of risk-taking and reduces his appetite for risk. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) report that CEO experience is negatively related to risk appetite. Similarly, CEO experience has also been positively related to maintaining the status quo by Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson (1993) and negatively related to strategic change by Grimm and Smith (1991) and Thomas and Ramaswamy (1996) .
Thus, the extant literature suggests that we can have no strong priors on the signs of the CEO biographical characteristics of age, education and experience. We use two variables to proxy for experience, CEO time in role and CEO time on other boards. The positive relationship is related to the ability of larger financial institutions to operate with lower capital ratios (Liang and Rhoades, 1991) and pursue riskier activities (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997) . Size is measured as the log of total assets. Following
Chen at al. (2006), we also control for off-balance sheet activity (Non-regular income)
and expect a positive relationship with firm volatility 12 . Finally, following Akhigbe and Martin's (2008) study of US financial service sector, we control for the impact of 11 We thank an anonymous referee for this insight. 12 For banks and other financial firms, off-balance sheet activity is measured as non-interest income divided by total income; for insurance companies, it is non-premium income over total income. leverage (Leverage) on firm volatility. Normally, higher leverage is associated with higher stock price volatility. However, as argued in the introduction, the strong creditor rights faced by UK firms have the potential to reduce CEO risk-taking. Thus, the effect of leverage on firm volatility can be positive or negative. A negative effect suggests that the UK bankruptcy code plays an important role in CEO decision-making.
[Insert 
Methodology:
This section presents the empirical specification of the determinants of firm volatility. Let V it be the computed volatility for the returns of firm i at t, where V it ∈ {TV it , SYSV it , IDIOV it }. Let CWT it be the estimated CEO wealth, X it be the vector of CEO biographical characteristics, and C it the vector of firm specific characteristics (control variables). Consider the following specification for:
where α is a scalar, γ and δ are k-dimensional vectors of coefficients, λ i are unobserved firm fixed effects, and ζ it is a disturbance term assumed to be normally and independently distributed, with mean zero and variance 2 ξ σ .
One salient problem with the estimation of equation (2) 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation and a Hausman test to investigate whether
CWT it is affected by endogeneity bias. The previous period CEO wealth (CWT i, ) is used as an instrument. The economic rationale is that CEO decisions are persistent, and business conditions tend to be autocorrelated, leading to autocorrelation in the CEO wealth which depends directly on these factors. Given the strong persistence in equitybased compensation, we expect CWT i,t-1 to be a powerful predictor of CWT it . At the same time, the lagged CEO wealth cannot depend on current firm volatility measures and hence is uncorrelated with the current period disturbance term (i.e., exogenous). To check for under identification (whether instruments are correlated with endogenous variables), the Anderson-Canon LM statistic is reported. We also perform the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak identification test to control for biased estimators due to weak instruments.
In a second step, we model the relation between firm volatility and wealth in a simultaneous-equation to capture the potential feedback effect. We estimate this relationship in a framework of a system of equations where the equation for firm volatility is as specified in equation (2) and the wealth specification follows Chen et al.
:
where η, τ and ς are scalars. V it ∈ {TV it , SYSV it , IDIOV it } is the computed firm volatility,
is the natural logarithm of total assets; SP it stands for the fiscal year-end stock price, λ i are unobserved firm fixed effects, and ε it is a disturbance term assumed to be normally and independently distributed, with mean zero and variance 2 ε σ . We estimate equations (2) and (3) simultaneously using three-stage least squares (3SLS), where the disturbance terms are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated.
Results
We first test whether the estimated CEO wealth is endogenous. The Hausman test provides significant evidence of an endogeneity bias at the 5% level between all firm volatility measures and CEO wealth, suggesting the latter requires instrumentation (see Table 4 ). The Anderson-Canon test is significant and indicates that equation (2) Golden and Zajac (2001) and Chok and Sun (2007) and the argument that older CEOs are more confident in taking challenging and risky decisions. CEO Education is significant for all three measures of risk but affects firm volatility negatively, suggesting that educated CEOs tend to adopt a more cautious approach to risk-taking.
With respect to executive experience, tenure in the current job (CEO time in role) is significant and negative for all three measures of volatility, while CEO time in other boards also has a negative significant effect on total and idiosyncratic volatilities. This result provides evidence for the argument that experience leads the CEO to recognize the pitfalls of risk-taking and reduces his appetite for risk.
The coefficient of the instrumented CEO wealth is not significant for any of the specifications and the sign varies. This weak relationship warrants further robustness analysis.
14 With respect to the control variables, size (total assets) has a positive and significant effect on firm volatility. This is consistent with the argument that larger financial institutions have the ability to operate with low capital ratios and pursue riskier activities. Leverage has a positive and significant impact on firm volatility, which confirms the conventional relationship between leverage and volatility. Contrary to expectations, non-regular income has a positive and significant effect on the total and idiosyncratic volatilities.
Overall, these results suggest that firm volatility is sensitive to the risk appetite of the CEO reflected in the demographic variables as well as to the other control variables.
On the other hand, there is no significant relationship between firm volatility and CEO wealth.
14 Preliminary robustness checks suggest that wealth and biographical characteristics are complementary. When we run the regressions without wealth, the significance of the biographical variables is diminished. This suggests that wealth and the biographical variables are complementary and that both are required for the correct model specification. (Green, 2003) . The results of the 3SLS are generally consistent with the results reported in Table 4 with respect to the CEO biographical and control variables. The main difference is that Non-regular income is only significant for idiosyncratic volatility.
Results are different for the CEO wealth, which is positive but becomes significant in most specifications. This is evidence in support of the risk-taking hypothesis, implying that the CEO's risk appetite increases as his stock of equity-based wealth increases, inciting him to pursue strategies that increase the volatility of the firm.
[Insert table 5]
Further robustness checks
In this section we conduct further robustness checks to ensure the validity of the foregoing results. First, as an additional measure of firm volatility, we calculate a Z-score to account for insolvency (distance to default). Following Boyd et al. (1993) and Pathan Assets)}. Calculated this way, the Z-score has an inverse form, i.e. 1/Z, in order to make the interpretation of the signs of coefficients comparable. Thus, a high Z-score means more default risk.
Results are reported in table 6. The results with respect to CEO characteristics are qualitatively similar to those in tables 4 and 5. The CEO accumulated option, however, is not significant in any specification. One plausible explanation is that while option values are enhanced by increased volatility, these values would be destroyed in the case of default. Interestingly, and contrary to the results in tables 4 and 5, we find that firm size is negative and significant with respect to insolvency, reflecting perhaps the "too big to fail" factor.
Second, we employ the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) . The GMM estimator combines a set of first differenced equations with equations in levels, where instrument variables are generated within the system. The consistency of the GMM estimates is subject to the absence of higher-order serial correlation in the regression error term and to an optimal choice of instruments. The results are reported in Table 7 . Tests for serial correlation are, denoted as AR(1) and AR(2), are both statistically insignificant, suggesting the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is not significant, indicating that the instruments used in the GMM estimation are not correlated with the error term.
The results of the GMM estimations confirm the results in Tables 4, 5 For example, the statistically significant negative coefficients on CEO education across all the measures of risk suggest that educated CEOs are associated with lower risk.
Similarly, the statistically significant positive coefficients on CEO age across all measures of firm risk except systematic volatility (SYSV) suggest that CEO age relates positively to firm volatility. Overall, the GMM estimates in Table 7 provide further empirical evidence that CEO risk appetite measures are the key determinants of firm volatility.
Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of CEO risk appetite on firm volatility for a sample of large, listed financial firms over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . We use four measures of firm volatility, five proxies for risk appetite, three control variables for firm characteristics and three estimation methodologies to test this relation.
The results give strong evidence that the CEO risk appetite has an important effect on firm volatility. The biographical measures for CEO risk appetite are significant explanatory variables of all measures of firm volatility employed in this study. The effect of CEO age is significant and positive while CEO Education, executive experience with other firm boards (CEO time in other boards) and CEO tenure in the current job (CEO time in role) have a negative and significant effect on total and idiosyncratic risk. These results highlight the importance of CEO risk appetite in the determination of firm volatility and suggest that age, education and job experience should be considered when determining CEO compensation packages.
Where shareholders, financial regulators, governments and managers are concerned, the implication is that when trying to understand the level of firm volatility with a view to regulatory decisions, the pertinent CEO biographical characteristics should be considered. We have identified a number of these characteristics but, clearly, this is a topic where further research is needed to strengthen and deepen our knowledge. This simple but versatile approach provides a basis for generating further hypotheses about other variables, which may affect the risk appetite of CEOs, that we have not studied in this article, but which might be incorporated in future work. 
CEO wealth
The value of all equity holdings, unexpired stock and LTIPs options accumulated and held by the CEO to date (£, thousands).
CEO age
In years CEO education # of professional and academic qualifications
CEO time in role
In years, the length of time that the CEO has been in the current role
CEO time in other boards
In years, the total length of time spent by the CEO at board level within quoted companies other than that being viewed, divided by the number of those companies
Log (Total assets)
Total assets of the company
Non regular income
The percentage of income derived from non-regular sources (nonpremium income in the case of insurance companies, and non-interest income for banks and other financials)
Leverage
The ratio of long-term total debt to total assets.
Stock price
Fiscal year-end stock price (pence)
Total volatility (TV)
The annual Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficients Note TV (Total Volatility), IDIOV (Idiosyncratic Volatility) are multiplied by 100, SYSV (Systematic Volatility) is multiplied by 10.. The estimator is three-stage least-squares. For full definition of variables see Table 1 . t statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). Note: The dependent variable is Z-score (Distance to default). The estimator in columns (1) and (2) is instrumental variables (IV), with an instrumented CEO wealth. Instrument is one period lagged CEO accumulated option. The estimator for columns (3) and (4) three-stage least-squares. For full definition of variables see Table 1 . t statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). TV (Total Volatility), IDIOV (Idiosyncratic Volatility) are multiplied by 100, SYSV (Systematic Volatility) is multiplied by 10, Z-score (Distance to default). The models are estimated using ArellanoBond system GMM estimator and include year dummies. Second lag period and earlier are used as instruments. F-test is a test of the joint significance of reported coefficient estimates under null hypothesis. Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions under the null of instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order serial correlation in residuals. For full definition of variables see Table 1 . t statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05).
